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Imitation and Learning under
Uncertainty
A Vignette Experiment
Davide Barrera and Vincent Buskens
Utrecht University
abstract: Trust is important in organizations, e.g. in teams or small working groups
in which the performance of team members depends on the performance of other
members in the group and in which team members have only an incentive to per-
form well if they trust that others perform as well. Existing theories regarding
effects of communication on trust problems stress the influence of information
about behaviour of potential partners. Effects of imitation are less extensively elab-
orated in the literature. In this article, the authors develop a theory about imitation
in combination with other network effects on trust. They propose a distinction
between imitation and other types of learning, contrasting trustors who only know
that other trustors have been trustful in transactions with a trustee with trustors
who also know that this trustee was in fact trustworthy. The theory predicts that
both imitation and learning have an effect in trust situations and that these effects
depend on uncertainties for the trustor. The authors designed a vignette experi-
ment that enables the distinction between imitation and learning for different lev-
els of uncertainty. The experiment provides strong support for learning effects on
trust and some support for imitation effects. There is only limited evidence that the
imitation effects depend on uncertainty.
keywords: control ✦ imitation ✦ learning ✦ social networks ✦ trust
Introduction
Assume you are relatively new in a firm in which projects are often exe-
cuted in small groups or pairs. Recently, you have been assigned to a proj-
ect for which you have to do the initial part and you are dependent on the
performance of a colleague for the reward you will receive for the end
product. If you suspect that your colleague will not do his or her fair share
for this project, you prefer not to work yourself because you will not get
fair credit for your efforts anyway. If you trust that your colleague will
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work hard, you are prepared to work hard yourself as well. The problem
described here has the structure of a trust problem as we define it in more
detail later in the article. Trust is clearly essential for the performance of
the focal actor and, if this type of trust problem occurs regularly, for the
performance of the firm as a whole. Costa et al. (Costa et al., 2001; see also
Costa, 2000) have already shown empirically that trust is related to per-
formance in teams. Dirks (1999) provides experimental evidence for the
relation between trust and performance, at least if team members are
motivated to perform their tasks well.
Trusting colleagues is especially difficult for an employee who is new
in a firm and is uncertain about what to expect from his or her colleagues.
Such a person might be inclined to build in some additional control on
colleagues to make sure that they do their jobs properly. Alternatively, he
or she might look at how other colleagues solve their trust problems and
adapt his or her behaviour accordingly, even if it is unclear whether the
behaviour of others is effective in terms of reaching mutually cooperative
behaviour. This brings us to the sociological angle on this topic, namely,
how social networks affect trust in situations as described earlier.
The idea that social embeddedness promotes trust is well known and
accepted in sociology (Granovetter, 1985). Existing theories address the
importance of social networks, hypothesizing effects of reputation (Raub
and Weesie, 1990), learning and control (Buskens and Raub, 2002) and gos-
sip (Burt, 2001; Burt and Knez, 1995). Nevertheless, these theories do not
account for all network mechanisms affecting individual decisions in trust
problems. Particularly, we believe that effects of imitation on trust problems
are largely neglected. By imitation we refer to situations where actors fac-
ing a trust problem base their decision upon observing behaviour of other
trustors in similar conditions. If several other trustors trust a certain trustee
their behaviour can be perceived as a signal that trust can be placed safely,
even though it is unknown whether this trustee honours trust. In other
words, sometimes individuals decide to trust somebody just because they
see others do so. Imitative behaviour is traditionally considered a form of
social learning that plays an important role in the socialization process (see,
for example, Bandura and Walters, 1963: Ch. 2). Imitation might be per-
formed if it is seen as the most convenient way to arrive at a better decision,
especially when accurate information is not easily available, and, in this
specific sense, imitation can be viewed as a sensible and even rational
behaviour (see Hedström [1998] on ‘rational imitation’). This does not
exclude the possibility that imitation can have perverse effects. If actors
realize that their partners’ best option is to base their decision on behaviour
of similar others without knowing outcomes, there will be more room for
opportunistic behaviour compared to situations where outcomes can be
observed as well. This article studies imitation and other types of learning
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in trust problems. Some empirical evidence for the importance of imitation
is provided by means of a vignette experiment that tests hypotheses about
imitation and other types of learning under different conditions.
We now define what we mean by a trust problem more precisely. In line
with Coleman (1990: Ch. 5), we conceive a trust problem as an interaction
involving two interdependent actors with the following properties:
1. The opportunity for one actor (Ego) to place some resources at the
disposal of another actor (Alter) who has the option to honour or abuse
trust.
2. A structure of preferences such that Ego prefers to place trust if Alter is
trustworthy, but regrets placing trust if Alter is untrustworthy; while
for Alter abusing trust is preferred over honouring, but honouring trust
is preferred over a situation in which trust is not placed.
3. There is no formal guarantee that protects Ego from the possibility that
Alter abuses trust.
4. There is a time lag between the decision of Ego and the action of Alter.
The strategic risk is caused either by these ‘time asymmetries’
(Coleman, 1990: 91) between the decision of Ego and Alter, or by infor-
mation asymmetries about the object of the transaction (Kollock, 1994),
or more generally, the strategic risk is generated by the actors’ interde-
pendence (Raub and Weesie, 2000).
In game-theoretic terms, a simple trust problem between a pair of actors
can be represented in the extensive form presented in Figure 1, which is
also known as the trust game, or TG (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Dasgupta,
1988; Kreps, 1990). This formalization captures the essential features of the
problem. The game begins with a move by Ego, who has a choice between
trusting and not trusting Alter. If Ego withholds trust, the game ends. In
this case, Ego receives PE and Alter receives PA. If Ego chooses to place
trust, Alter has the possibility to honour or abuse that trust. If Alter hon-
ours trust, he obtains RA > PA and Ego obtains RE > PE, while if he abuses
the trust Alter receives TA > RA and Ego is left with SE < PE.
1 This game can
be seen as a one-sided version of the well-known Prisoner’s Dilemma. For
this reason we use the same notation for the payoffs that is normally used
for the Prisoner Dilemma, where T stands for temptation, R for reward, P
for punishment and S for the sucker’s payoff. The standard game-theoretic
prediction is that Ego will not trust in a one-shot TG. If Ego places trust,
Alter will abuse it because TA > RA. Consequently, Ego knowing the payoff
structure should withhold trust because PE > SE. This is the subgame per-
fect equilibrium (in Figure 1 represented by double lines). The payoffs in
equilibrium are therefore PE and PA. This outcome is suboptimal, because
both actors would prefer the payoffs yielded in the situation in which trust
is placed and honoured, RE and RA.
 at University of Groningen on November 10, 2008 http://iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
International Sociology Vol. 22 No. 3
370
This formalization of the TG resembles an isolated encounter between
two isolated actors, but a single encounter between two actors is too sim-
plistic to account for the real complexity of human transactions.
Transactions between pairs of actors are often embedded in a complex
system of social relation (Granovetter, 1985) which promotes trust, reduc-
ing the risk derived from interdependence (Raub and Weesie, 2000). In
addition, actors are seldom perfectly informed on the incentives of the
other actor. There might be uncertainty on, for example, whether or not
the other actor is actually able to do his or her part of the job well even
when he or she is trying.
In the second section, we elaborate on the distinction between imitation
and learning. We present theoretical arguments about mechanisms
through which embeddedness affects trust under uncertainty. The third
section of the article presents a vignette experiment that provides evi-
dence of network effects in a specific trust problem. The experiment is
designed to define specific conditions such as uncertainty that could facil-
itate imitative behaviour. The section describes the experimental set-up












Figure 1 Trust Game (RE > PE > SE; TA > RA > PA)
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of the empirical analysis. The final section presents conclusions and iden-
tifies possibilities for future research.
Theory
First, we introduce another example of a trust problem that will provide
a frame for the theoretical model as well as a suitable scenario for the
experiment (see Appendix). Imagine a student (Ego) who has the idea of
starting an e-business. The investment requires an initial capital of about
€5000, but Ego has only €3000 available. This money is not sufficient to
realize the investment in time. Within her cohort there is another student
(Alter), who is a stockbroker. Alter is known to make money investing
small amounts on the stock market. Alter offers Ego the possibility to
invest her money in the stock market in order to obtain the capital for the
e-business. In exchange, Alter asks for 10 percent of the profit, but he does
not share the losses if the investment fails. Since Ego does not have the
competence to invest alone, Alter has the possibility to lie about the out-
come of the investment and keep (part of) the profit he made for himself.
This scenario displays all essential features of a trust problem as defined
in the introduction. Ego prefers to invest her money if Alter is trustwor-
thy, but to keep the money and renounce the e-business if Alter is untrust-
worthy. Alter, on the other hand, realizes a greater gain by abusing trust,
but prefers honouring trust to the case in which trust is not placed. The
scenario has two additional desirable characteristics. First, the stock mar-
ket accounts for the type of uncertainty that we are trying to model.
Second, it provides a setting that is realistic enough to use as a frame for
our experiment.
Now, we elaborate on the importance of embeddedness for trust. Note
that these theoretical arguments are not restricted to trust problems in teams
within organizations, but generalize to a variety of trust problems including,
for example, alliance formation among firms and buyer–supplier relations
(see Buskens et al., 2003). We elaborate on the validity of the experimental
test for different applications in the conclusion.
We distinguish two dimensions of embeddedness: first, Ego and Alter
can face the same trust problem repeatedly, and, second, Ego can have
relations with other actors who had or have similar trust problems with
Alter (for a more general discussion of this issue, see Raub and Weesie,
2000). We refer to the first dimension as dyadic embeddedness and to the
second as network embeddedness. Dyadic embeddedness can enforce
cooperation, casting a shadow on the future that discourages opportunis-
tic behaviour (Axelrod, 1984), or it can lead actors to trust each other more
easily if they have a history of past cooperative relations (Gautschi, 2000).
Network embeddedness represents the possibility that actors are not only
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involved in bilateral transactions, but also have contacts with third parties.
Information about trustworthiness of actors circulates in the network,
determining the emergence of reputation (Raub and Weesie, 1990). Buskens
and Raub (2002) distinguish two mechanisms through which dyadic and
network embeddedness induce cooperation: learning and control. Learning
refers to changes in Ego’s trust in Alter depending on information about
past performance of Alter either from Ego’s own experiences or from third-
party experiences. Learning effects are stronger for networks where
information circulates faster (see Buskens, 2002: Ch. 4; Buskens and
Yamaguchi, 1999). Clearly, Ego’s trust increases if information about Alter
is positive, and decreases if information about Alter is negative. Control is
based on Alter’s anticipation of future sanctions for abuse of trust (see
Buskens and Weesie [2000a] for a game-theoretic model about control
effects through social networks).2 The larger the potential sanctions for
Alter if Ego does not trust Alter anymore or if Ego damages Alter’s repu-
tation by informing third parties about an abuse of trust, the less likely
Alter will abuse trust. Consequently, Ego can trust Alter better as a result
of this control mechanism if her sanction potential is larger after a possi-
ble abuse of trust by Alter.
In this article, we elaborate on the framework mentioned earlier by
adding imitation as a third mechanism. In order to study the role of
imitation in supporting trust and compare this with learning, we first
elaborate on some existing theories with respect to learning. Learning
mechanisms have been studied and modelled by several scholars. Actors
adapt their choices depending on information they receive that is relevant
for the decision they have to make. This information can come either from
one’s own experience or from experiences of others who have to make
similar decisions. In such models, actors look at their own past and repeat
choices that proved to be successful (Macy, 1990), or they update their
behaviour after observing the (or a sample of) choices made by others and
the outcomes that these actors obtained (e.g. Ellison and Fudenberg, 1995;
Erev and Roth, 1998).
Some economics scholars who developed these learning models
(Pingle, 1995; Pingle and Day, 1996; Schlag, 1998) use the label ‘imitation’
for models in which individuals decide after receiving information about
the outcomes obtained by others and compare them employing some effi-
ciency criteria. Yet there are situations in which these learning models do
not apply. For instance, if actors can observe other people’s behaviour but
not their payoffs, existing models do not make predictions about the
effects this kind of information has on the behaviour of Ego. Such decision
problems have been largely neglected in the literature.
In this article, we focus precisely on this type of decision with respect to
trust problems. From now on, we use the label ‘learning’ for any decision
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based on information that includes the outcomes of a given transaction.
The term ‘imitation’ is restricted to situations where individuals base their
decisions on the behaviour of others who are in a similar position as Ego,
i.e. they are also trustors, without having any information about the out-
comes obtained by these others. This definition is inspired by psycholog-
ical definitions of imitation (see Byrne and Russon [1998] on some of the
definitional controversies within psychology), focusing on copying behav-
iour while explicitly excluding a reinforcement argument, namely, that
the behaviour is copied because it leads to desirable results.
Moreover, Ego might observe behaviour of third parties in relation with
even ‘fourth’ parties and base her decision on this information. To distin-
guish clearly between these different types of third parties, we introduce
the label ‘Other Egos’ for third parties who have transactions in a similar
role as Ego, i.e. they also have to decide whether or not to trust someone
else. We use the label ‘Other Alters’ for third parties that are in a similar role
as Alter and with whom Other Egos have been involved in trust problems.
Situations in which actors observe behaviour of others and then choose a
strategy are not difficult to imagine, but also situations in which informa-
tion regarding choices made by other individuals would not be sufficient
are conceivable. When deciding whether to trust a colleague on a collabo-
rative effort, we observe how many other people trust him or her in order
to have a clue. When deciding whether to confide in somebody about some
serious personal problems, we would presumably consider the number of
others that confide in him or her irrelevant, especially if we do not know
whether that person was trustworthy or not. It is hence plausible that some
conditions facilitate imitation in trust problems and others hinder it.
Generally speaking, we might expect imitation to take place preferably in
relatively unfamiliar situations (see Pingle, 1995; Podolny, 1993, 2001) and
in situations in which an eventual abuse of trust is not ‘life-threatening’.
More precisely, we expect imitation as well as learning to be associated
with uncertainty (Podolny, 2001). We claim that individuals facing trust
problems in which they are uncertain about the possible outcomes will
imitate others especially when adaptive learning is difficult and better
information is not available (Nooteboom, 2002: 5–8). In our example of the
student who lets a fellow invest her money in the stock market, we dis-
tinguish two types of uncertainty:
Partner uncertainty is uncertainty for Ego about the abilities of Alter to
obtain a good outcome for Ego even if he tries to act trustworthily.
Market uncertainty is the uncertainty for Ego that Alter will reach a good
profit even if he tries to act trustworthily and he is able to do so.
In terms of the example, the first type of uncertainty refers to how compe-
tent Alter is as a stockbroker. The second type of uncertainty refers to the
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situation that Alter loses the money of Ego due to unforeseeable circum-
stances. Even if Alter is doing everything in the right way, investments
might go wrong and Ego loses her money. In this situation, the student will
always be uncertain about the causes of her misfortune because she cannot
distinguish between actual untrustworthy behaviour of the stockbroker,
just unintended suboptimal investments or unforeseeable circumstances.
Given that Ego is uncertain about the capacities of Alter but also about
the functioning of the market as a whole, it is important for her that Other
Egos have good experiences with Alter and even that Other Alters are
doing well because this indicates that it is possible to make a good profit
with stock market investments. And, if information about the actual out-
comes of certain investments is unknown, it will be reassuring that Other
Egos are involved in similar types of transactions. This leads to the follow-
ing set of testable hypotheses about the effects of learning and imitation.
Hypothesis 1 (partner uncertainty): The less information Ego has about the capac-
ities of Alter, the less trustful Ego is.
Hypothesis 2 (network learning): The more information Ego has received from
Other Egos that Alter or Other Alters were trustworthy in past transactions
with Other Egos, the more trustful Ego is.
Hypothesis 3 (imitation): The more Ego knows that Other Egos trusted Alter or
Other Alters, the more trustful Ego is.
Clearly, we would expect negative effects on trust if Ego has negative
experiences or receives negative information, but we will not test these
hypotheses in the vignette experiment discussed later.
The theoretical models on which our hypotheses are based (Buskens,
2002) predict also an effect of learning from dyadic embeddedness (i.e.
information on previous trust problems between Ego and Alter). Other
studies have included variables accounting for this effect in terms of a
common past between Ego and Alter (Barrera, 2005; Buskens, 2002;
Gautschi, 2000). These variables represented the history of the relation
between the two focal actors and the effects of these variables generally
supported the learning hypothesis. However, in our experiment we do
not want to consider the case in which Ego and Alter have a common past
for the following reason. We expect that, consistent with the earlier find-
ings, Ego’s own common past with Alter has such a strong effect that it
obscures the network effects that are the focus of this article. For example,
if Ego has already made stock market investments with Alter, she hardly
needs to learn from the network or to imitate Other Egos, for she can
decide primarily on her own experience. In an experiment such as the one
described later, it is always preferable to restrict the number of variables
that are varied. Therefore, we will not test the hypothesis on learning
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from dyadic embeddedness in this article. For the same reason, we will
also not test the hypothesis on dyadic learning about Other Alters.
Since network learning refers to more complete information than imi-
tation, we expect learning effects to be larger than imitation effects when
there is both information referring to Alter and information referring to
Other Alters.
Hypothesis 4 (learning vs imitation): The effect of learning about trustworthiness
of Alter (Other Alters) is stronger than the effect of imitation of trustfulness
towards Alter (Other Alters) for information about similar transactions.
As explained in the theory, we expect the effects of information to be more
important if uncertainty is larger, i.e. (1) if uncertainty about Alter’s
capacities is larger, information about Alter is more important and (2) if
Ego has less knowledge about the market all information about interac-
tions of Alter as well as Other Alters is more important.
Hypothesis 5: The effects of information that concerns Alter (i.e. Alter’s trust-
worthiness and Other Egos’ trustfulness towards Alter) are larger if the
uncertainty about the capacities of Alter is larger.
Hypothesis 6: All effects of network learning and imitation are larger if Ego has
less knowledge about the market.
Furthermore, we provide a test for control effects in this experiment. As
indicated earlier, the existence of a common future creates sanction possi-
bilities for Ego after an abuse of trust. Moreover, the faster Ego can inform
third parties about an abuse of trust of Alter, the larger Alter’s loss after
an abuse of trust and thus the less likely it is that Alter will abuse trust.
Hypotheses on control effects have been tested in another vignette exper-
iment (Buskens and Weesie, 2000b), but the framing of that experiment
exposed the results to some criticism concerning the interpretation of the
variables operationalizing control effects. In the present design we tried to
overcome these criticisms, using a frame in which the effective social net-
work is better defined. The students’ cohort provides a specific network
in which presumably each member knows all other members.3 Therefore,
the following two hypotheses on control effects closely resemble analo-
gous hypotheses presented in the Buskens and Weesie (2000b) experi-
ment, but the operationalizations allow less alternative interpretations of
the effects.
Hypothesis 7 (dyadic control): The more transactions Ego and Alter expect to
have in the future, the more trustful Ego is.
Hypothesis 8 (network control): The more Ego is able to inform Other Egos and
the denser the network among Egos, the more trustful Ego is.
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Method
Imitation as a mechanism for actors to solve trust problems is not easily
observable in real life, because it relies on mental processes that are intrin-
sically difficult to observe. Although some empirical evidence of mimic trust
from ‘real-life’ data is available (Wittek, 2001), experimental data are par-
ticularly suitable, for they can reproduce simple situations in which actors
are required to make choices given very little – but very well specified –
information about a choice situation. Precisely for this reason, we realized
a vignette experiment in which we vary the kinds of information that dis-
tinguish imitation from other types of learning. Vignettes are simple
descriptions that sketch hypothetical situations reproducing real-life prob-
lems. Respondents are selected voluntarily and asked to imagine how they
would solve the dilemma that is depicted in the vignette. Rossi and his col-
leagues introduced vignette experiments in sociology in the 1970s (for an
overview of their research, see Rossi and Nock, 1982). Recently, vignette
experiments have been applied to study economic transactions (Buskens
and Weesie, 2000b; Rooks et al., 2000). We opted for a design similar to that
applied by Buskens and Weesie. In their experiments they presented pairs
of vignettes with different characteristics to respondents and asked them to
give a simple preference for one vignette out of each pair. This method is
called paired comparison. Assuming that subjects find it easier to express a
preference for a vignette out of a pair rather than rate several vignettes
according to their preferences, we expect choices with paired comparison to
be easier for the subject and to provide more realistic results, especially
when differences between options are rather subtle.
The Scenario
A vignette experiment typically begins with a scenario that provides the
‘frame’ for the actor’s decision. Subsequently, the actor has to evaluate a
series of vignettes in which crucial information is varied. The scenario must
reproduce a trust situation in which actors choose under uncertainty, and the
independent variables of the vignettes should include information giving
room to learning and imitative behaviour. In our scenario, Ego is a student
and the cohort that attends university classes with Ego provides network
embeddedness. The experimental network is imaginary, but it refers to an
existing group to which Ego belongs, which provides the subject with a real-
istic and effective network of informants. It should be relatively easy for sub-
jects to imagine themselves in the hypothetical situation because the subjects
are students at a Dutch university from the same cohort.
In our experiment it is hypothesized that Ego needs some money to set
up an e-business, and it is important that she realizes this investment
quickly not to lose the opportunity. Alter is a schoolmate of Ego who is a
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stockbroker. There is a possibility for Ego to let Alter invest her savings on
the stock market in exchange for 10 percent of the potential profits. The
trust problem arises from asymmetry in the information available to Ego
and Alter: Alter knows the probability that he can realize the profit.
Moreover, assuming that Ego is unable to monitor the profits, Alter has an
incentive to claim that the investment was unsuccessful while it was actu-
ally successful, which gives him an additional profit, since he does not
share potential losses. Some details are emphasized in the instructions to
make the story more concrete: Ego wants to conclude the business as
quickly as possible, she needs €5000 as initial capital and she only has
€3000; a loan from the parents or from a bank is not an available option. We
decided to use the example of the stock market in our experiment for two
reasons. First, the stock market accounts in a credible way for the possibil-
ity that the transaction yields a negative outcome for Ego, even if Alter has
the will to perform well. Second, the scenario was particularly realistic for
the students who participated in the experiment because they were study-
ing IT management and economics. According to their professor, they were
expected to have a certain familiarity with the type of problems described
in our experiment, because the students had to think about initiating an IT
investment for one of the assignments in the course in which this experi-
ment was done. The English translation of the text that was presented to the
students as the ‘scenario’ and the ‘task’ can be found in the Appendix.
Vignettes are presented to the subjects in pairs and vary with respect to
key characteristics of embeddedness and uncertainty. In order to make the
comparison easier, the vignettes are presented as referring to two differ-
ent Alters with different characteristics.4 Subjects are instructed that two
schoolmates in their cohort are known as expert stockbrokers (Jansen and
de Vries).5 This expedient only serves the purpose of facilitating the imag-
inary choice to the subjects associating the characteristics to two different
persons.6 Figure 2 presents an example of a pair of vignettes between
which actors had to choose.
Independent Variables
Independent variables are the characteristics that are listed at the vignettes.
We assume that the subjects choose according to the utility they associate
with each vignette. The characteristics that are varied in the vignettes
should refer to those aspects of a trust problem that are indeed relevant for
an actor’s decision in similar situations. Six characteristics are varied: three
for network embeddedness (information available to Ego, Outdegree and
Density), one for dyadic embeddedness (Future), one for uncertainty
(Partner Uncertainty) and one for the city where Alter studied finance (City).
Table 1 shows the specific formulations of all vignette variables.
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❏ Jansen ❏ De Vries
De Vries
• De Vries studied finance in Zwolle at
college level.
• De Vries will continue his studies at this
university.
• De Vries and his friends from the cohort
meet rarely outside university.
• As far as you know, no other students in
your cohort have ever done similar
investments with de Vries or with any-
body else.
• You have friends in common with de
Vries.
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Partner Uncertainty represents uncertainty about Alter’s capacity to
honour trust. Assuming that education in finance increases one’s compe-
tence about the stock market, this variable is operationalized as previous
formal education in finance, with two categories: previous education in
finance versus no information about previous education. Alter’s tempta-
tion to abuse trust decreases if his competence increases. In addition, Ego
will perceive higher uncertainty about Alter if she has no information
about Alter’s competence, and lower uncertainty if Ego knows that Alter
has previous education in finance. Partner Uncertainty takes the value 1
when no information is provided about the previous education of Alter,
and 0 when Alter had formal education in finance. The category 0 is split
into two subcategories that vary with respect to the city where Alter got
his degree. This supplementary variation refers indeed to a different vari-
able, City, which is discussed next. We decided to incorporate the variable
City into Partner Uncertainty in order to reduce the total number of
descriptions of characteristics in the vignette.
City varies with respect to the city where Alter obtained his degree in
finance. One objection against an experimental set-up such as the one we
propose here is that variation in any variable produces significant effects
on the dependent variable, because subjects react in some way consis-
tently to the variations the experimenters come up with. In order to
Figure 2 A Pair of Vignettes
Jansen
• You do not know the educational back-
ground of Jansen.
• Jansen will move to a foreign insitute to
finish his studies soon after the results
of your investment are known.
• Jansen and his friends from the cohort
meet regularly outside university.
• You know that other students in your
cohort have done similar investments
with people other than Jansen and they
had good results.
• You have friends in common with
Jansen.
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Table 1 Description of the Variables in the Vignette Experiment
Variable Value Text
Partner Uncertainty 0 Jansen (de Vries) studied finance in Zwolle
(or Den Bosch) at college level.
1 You do not know the educational background
of Jansen (de Vries).
City 0 Jansen (de Vries) studied finance in Zwolle at
college level. 
1 Jansen (de Vries) studied finance in Den Bosch
at college level. 
Future 0 Jansen (de Vries) will move to a foreign institute 
to finish his studies soon after the results of 
your investment are known.
1 Jansen (de Vries) will continue his studies at this
university.
Density 0 Jansen (de Vries) and his friends from the cohort
meet rarely outside the university.
1 Jansen (de Vries) and his friends from the cohort
meet regularly outside the university.
No Information 0 As far as you know, no other students in your
cohort have ever done a similar investment with 
Jansen (de Vries) or with anybody else.
Other Egos’ 1 You know that other students in your cohort
Trustfulness vs have done similar investments with people
Other Alters other than Jansen (de Vries) but you do not
know the outcome.
Trustworthiness 2 You know that other students in your cohort  
of Other Alters have done similar investments with people 
other than Jansen (de Vries) and they 
had good results.
Other Egos’ 3 You know that other students in your cohort
Trustfulness have done similar investments with Jansen 
vs Alter (de Vries) but you do not know the outcome.
Trustworthiness 4 You know that other students in your cohort  
of Alter have done similar investments with Jansen
(de Vries) and they had good results.
Outdegree 0 You do not have any friends in common with
Jansen (de Vries).
1 You have friends in common with Jansen
(de Vries).
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challenge this criticism, we decided to include in our design an ‘irrele-
vant’ variable to test whether this variable produces any effect on the
choices of the subjects. We opted for the city where the partner attended
high school, because this seemed a feasible variable from which we do not
expect any effect. The two towns (Zwolle and Den Bosch) are two middle-
size relatively anonymous Dutch towns and we are not aware of any sig-
nificant difference in the quality of their programmes, hence we do not
expect any preference for one or the other.
Future indicates whether Ego and Alter have a common future. It takes
value 0 if Alter is going to leave the university soon after his transaction
with Ego is finished and 1 if Alter is not going to leave. Future is a variable
of dyadic embeddedness, which induces control effects (Buskens, 2002).
The ‘shadow of the future’ (Axelrod, 1984) provides Ego with opportuni-
ties to sanction Alter in case trust is abused. Even if it is less plausible that
Alter and Ego have more similar transactions in the future, some other
form of control, for example, through social sanctions, is plausible in the
given context. In the Buskens and Weesie (2000b) experiment, this variable
took value 0 if Ego was going to leave, but this formulation was more prob-
lematic. For example, the assumption that Alter knows that Ego is about to
leave was not very realistic in that scenario, and nevertheless this assump-
tion is necessary for potential sanctions to be effective.
Density indicates the closure of the common network. Density has value
1 if Alter and the other members of the cohort meet regularly outside the
university, while Density equals 0 if they seldom meet. Density induces
both control and learning effects, because information spreads more
quickly in a denser network allowing actors to learn about each other and
also to sanction defections.
Other Egos provide Ego with information about Alter’s competence or
about the population of potential Alters. Actors that can provide this
information to Ego are Other Egos who have been involved in similar
trust problems with Alter or with Other Alters. This information allows
Ego to learn or imitate. The related variable has five categories according
to different types of information provided (Table 1). The categories will be
transformed into four dummy variables in the analysis, with ‘no infor-
mation’ as the reference category. Category 4 provides Ego with informa-
tion about trustworthiness of Alter (Trustworthiness of Alter): Ego knows
that Other Egos did the same type of investment with Alter successfully.
In this case, information is specifically about the behaviour of Ego’s part-
ner. The formulation is very similar to the one used in previous experi-
ments (Buskens and Weesie, 2000b). Category 3 refers to Alter, but
information is less specific. Category 3 provides Ego with information
about trustfulness of Other Egos vs Alter (Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter):
Ego knows Other Egos did the same type of investment with Alter but
she does not know whether the investment was successful or not. The
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information provided here informs Ego about the extent to which Other
Egos trust Alter for similar trust problems. A decision based on this type
of information leads Ego to imitate Other Egos. In categories 2 and 1,
information refers to the same type of trust problem, but involving Other
Alters. Category 2 provides Ego with information about trustworthiness
of Other Alters (Trustworthiness of Other Alters): Ego knows that Other
Egos did the same deal with somebody other than Alter and the invest-
ment paid back. The partner is different, but the trust problem is exactly
the same. Ego can learn from this type of information, how often this type
of transaction was successful in general. Category 1 provides Ego with
information about trustfulness of Other Egos vs Other Alters (Other Egos’
Trustfulness vs Other Alters): Ego knows that Other Egos did the same type
of investments with other partners, but she does not know whether these
investments turned out successfully. In other words, Ego is informed
about the extent to which other people do this type of investment through
a partner. As for category 3, the effect of this type of information on Ego’s
decision is an effect of imitation. Category 0 refers to the situation in
which Ego has no information available from the network about this trust
problem with the same or a different partner. Summarizing, the informa-
tion available to Ego presented in the fourth description in the vignette
varies along two dimensions: first, Ego receives information about trans-
actions involving the same partner or different partners; second, informa-
tion includes or does not include the outcomes of these transactions.
Outdegree refers to common acquaintances in the network. It takes value
1 if Ego has some friends in common with Alter and value 0 if Ego has no
friend in common with Alter. As for Future, Outdegree mainly induces con-
trol effects; in fact Ego has the opportunity to sanction Alter, damaging his
reputation with the friends. As for Future, this operationalization is more
satisfactory than the one proposed by Buskens and Weesie (2000b). It refers
to friends within a well-defined network, which makes it plausible to
assume that Alter is concerned about consequences of his behaviour in the
transaction with Ego on his reputation with the other cohort fellows.
Subject Characteristics
Although evidence of how characteristics of actors correlate with trust is
extensive in the literature (see Snijders [1996] for a review), payoffs are
more important than individual characteristics in isolated trust problems.
Because we apply paired comparison, subject characteristics do not vary
within these choices, and there is no reason to expect that subjects prefer ‘de
Vries’ to ‘Jansen’ or the other way round. Therefore, subject characteristics
can only matter in the sense that some subjects find it more important to
know that Alter performed well in the past with Other Egos, while other
subjects find it more important that Alter does not leave the country soon
after the transaction is finished. This implies that subject characteristics can
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have effects only in interactions with the independent variables at the
vignettes. The only subject characteristic for which we have derived such
hypotheses in the theory section is stock market knowledge. Nevertheless, to
exclude other possible differences between subjects, we included a small
questionnaire at the end of the experiment to check that choices indeed do
not depend on these individual characteristics.
If Ego has some knowledge about the stock market, she can reasonably
estimate the risk connected with the described investment, and uncer-
tainty will then be related mainly to Alter’s capacity to be successful at the
stock market. In order to estimate Ego’s knowledge, subjects were asked
how familiar they were with the stock market and whether they were able
to operate on the stock market themselves. Answers were given on a four-
point scale (0 = not familiar at all; 1 = some basic knowledge, but not
familiar; 2 = some information but do not know how to operate; 3 = famil-
iar enough to invest on the stock market). Other questions about expert-
ise on economic issues regarded frequency of reading economic newspapers
and economic pages, and educational background in economics (Yes/No).
As the subjects’ expertise on economic issues is crucial for our hypothe-
ses, it seemed preferable to also have some more ‘objective’ measures for
this expertise. Therefore, subjects were asked to estimate the value of the
AEX (Amsterdam Exchange Index), Dow Jones and the exchange rate of
the US dollar/Dutch guilder on the day before the experiment and the
highest value over the last 12 months for all three indices. In addition, we
asked them how sure they were about each of these estimates. Subjects
were also asked to rank the following types of economic investment by
‘risk’: shares, options, bonds and stock options. Although subjects, on aver-
age, were not very knowledgeable about most of these issues, all issues
provided some information about their knowledge. We tried to construct
an index for stock market knowledge using different combinations of
these variables, and eventually we opted for the solution that seemed to
summarize this information most accurately. We ran a factor analysis,
using principal axis factoring, of the following variables: self-assessment
of familiarity with the stock market, self-confidence with the answers
about estimates of indices such as AEX and Dow Jones, actual errors in
these estimates and correctness of the answers to the ranking of invest-
ments by risk. The results indicate that the answers to this set of questions
are better explained by a one-factor solution, the Eigenvalues of the first
two factors being respectively 3.405 and 0.541. Therefore, the standard-
ized score of the first factor obtained with this analysis was used as an
index of stock market knowledge (Knowledge).7
Now, we describe the other subject characteristics in the questionnaire.
Personal characteristics included age, sex and size of the place of residence.
Birthplace and place of residence are included because the preference for the
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city in which Alter studied finance might be affected by Ego’s birthplace or
place of residence. Religious affiliation was included for the same reason,
because the high school in Zwolle is confessional. Subjects were also asked
how realistic they perceived the choice they had to make, and how difficult
it was for them to imagine the situation described on a five-point scale (0 =
absolutely unrealistic/difficult; 1 = pretty unrealistic; 2 = possible but
unlikely; 3 = realistic; 4 = absolutely realistic) to check whether subjects who
had more difficulty to position themselves in the choice situations made
different choices from subjects who did not have this difficulty. Related to
this, we built in some controls to compare the scenario with the actual situ-
ation of the subjects. Availability of resources was measured by asking for the
subject’s possibility of borrowing money (and from whom) and availability
of money required for the investment. Network parameters for the cohort of
subjects were measures comprising five questions, including the degree of
the subject (How many friends are there in your cohort with whom you
speak about personal problems? How many persons does your cohort con-
sist of?) and the density of the real network (How often have your cohort fel-
lows met outside the university in the last three months? How often did
you join in these meetings?). Finally, risk aversion is measured to test
whether risk-averse subjects find some aspects of embeddedness more
important than others, because risk aversion can affect cooperative behav-
iour in social dilemmas (Raub and Snijders, 1997). Moreover, our scenario
implies a certain hazard that might vary with individual risk aversion. Risk
preference was assessed using lotteries and probabilities equivalence ques-
tions (Donkers et al., 2001) based on Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).8 The hypotheses to be tested with the variables included in
the experiment are summarized in Table 2.
Experimental Design
A first choice in the design of the experiment regards the number of pairs
that has to be presented to each respondent. In order to avoid boredom
and loss of concentration, we decided to limit the number of pairs for each
subject to 10. Given that vignettes consist of three variables with two cat-
egories each, one with three categories and one variable with five cate-
gories, there are 3 × 2 × 2 × 2 × 5 = 120 different vignettes, and hence (120
× 119) / 2 = 7140 different pairs (variables may be constant within pairs).
This is the universe of possible pairs from which we chose a sample. We
excluded a number of pairs from the set of possible pairs, because for
these we considered the choice to be too obvious. For example, a compar-
ison between two vignettes with Future = 1 and Future = 0, ceteris paribus,
seems less interesting as everybody would presumably prefer a partner
with whom she has a common future (Future = 1). We reduced the num-
ber of feasible pairs to unordered pairs in the sense of Pareto ordering,
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excluding pairs for which one vignette has only advantages and no dis-
advantages compared to the other vignette.9 As a consequence of this
restriction, accepted pairs of vignettes vary in at least two independent
variables. The variable related to information available to Ego has five cat-
egories, which implies 10 combinations of two different values. Each com-
bination occurs exactly once within the set of vignettes for each subject.
We excluded pairs of vignettes that did not vary for this variable. Pairs in
which City = 1 in both vignettes are also excluded.10 These restrictions
dropped the number of possible pairs to 1700. Variables that are constant
within each pair were displayed anyway in order to enable testing
hypotheses on interaction effects with these variables. Each vignette was
assigned randomly to the left or right side of the pair. The order of vari-
ables on each vignette was always the same. Subjects were asked first to
choose which vignette within a pair they preferred. After this choice, the
subjects were asked to state how strong their preference was on a four-
point scale: 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = strong; 4 = very strong.11
Table 2 Hypotheses on Attractiveness of a Vignette
Expected sign of
Hyp. Independent variable the coefficient
1 Partner Uncertainty −
2 Trustworthiness of Alter +
2 Trustworthiness of Other Alters +
3 Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter +
3 Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Other Alters +
4 Trustworthiness of Alter > Other Egos’
Trustfulness vs Alter
4 Trustworthiness of Other Alters > Other Egos’
Trustfulness vs Other Alters
5 Partner Uncertainty × Trustworthiness of Alter +
5 Partner Uncertainty × Other Egos’ +
Trustfulness vs Alter
6 Knowledge × Trustworthiness of Alter −
6 Knowledge × Trustworthiness of Other Alters −
6 Knowledge × Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter −
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Analysis
For the statistical analysis of paired comparison we apply a random util-
ity model (McFadden, 1973). This model assumes that subjects attach a
certain utility (u) to each vignette, depending in a linear manner on its
attributes (z) plus a random component (ε). This random component is
included to account for the residual part of the utility that does not
depend linearly on the attributes of the vignettes. Formally, u(z) = z’ β + ε.
Subjects are assumed to choose the vignette with the highest utility and
this choice depends on the differences between attributes of each pair of
vignettes. The probability that one vignette is preferred over the other can
be estimated applying a probit model in which the differences between
the values of the variables of the two vignettes are used as independent
variables. The coefficients β can be interpreted as the effects of one-unit
differences in each of these variables on the attractiveness of a vignette.
Since independent variables are treated as qualitative attributes of the
vignettes, the coefficients can be compared but their size is not straight-
forwardly interpretable. Moreover, since the independent variables are
differences between attributes of vignettes, effects for variables that do
not vary within pairs of vignettes, such as subject characteristics, are not
identified in the statistical model. Therefore, due to the method of pair-
wise comparison, we cannot estimate main effects of subject characteris-
tics such as whether women trust more easily than men. Adding such an
effect would only indicate whether women or men have a left–right bias,
but would not have any further substantive implication.12 Subject charac-
teristics can be used in interaction terms if one has specific hypotheses
that, for example, the effect of uncertainty differs for more risk-averse
subjects compared to less risk-averse subjects. Interaction terms have to
be computed as differences of products of the respective values, because
the combined value of the two variables determines the utility of the com-
bination for a given vignette. The difference between the values of the two
products affects the choice between the vignettes. The model does not
include a constant, because a constant has also no substantive meaning
and should theoretically not be included in the model. When including
the constant, its value has to be interpreted as the a priori preference for a
subject for the left or the right vignette. To make sure that there is no such
bias, we did run a model including a constant term. In this model, the size
of all effects and their significance level were almost identical to those of
the model without the constant, and the constant itself was virtually equal
to zero. Therefore, we do not present this model here. Standard errors are
modified for clustering using the robust (Huber) estimator for clustered
data (Rogers, 1993) because observations are not independent, each sub-
ject having to make 10 choices. See Buskens and Weesie (2000b) for a
 at University of Groningen on November 10, 2008 http://iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
International Sociology Vol. 22 No. 3
386
slightly extended explanation of the specifics of the analysis strategy in a
similar experiment and a more formal presentation of the argument that
the constant should not be included in the model and main effects of sub-
ject characteristics not identified.
Main Effects
Table 3 shows two probit models on the choice of the vignettes. Model 1
only includes the main effects, model 2 also interaction terms. Table 3 dis-
plays the marginal effects of the independent variables. Thus, a positive
effect shows the corresponding increase in the probability that a vignette
with value 1 on a given attribute is preferred over one with value 0 on that
same attribute, ceteris paribus.
In model 1, most hypotheses on the main effects are supported.
Attractiveness of a vignette decreases with Partner Uncertainty, because
uncertainty about the partner has a negative effect on the probability that
trust is placed. All formulations of information available to Ego have a
positive significant effect, except for Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter. The
effect of Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter has the expected positive sign,
but it is not significant. Also the hypotheses about the difference between
the coefficients are supported, i.e. the effects of information only about
trustfulness of Other Egos (imitation) are smaller than the corresponding
effects of trustworthiness of Alter or Other Alters (learning). The most
surprising result is that imitation related to Other Alters has a larger
effect than imitation related to ‘Ego’s own’ Alter. Our explanation for this
is that imitation is more likely for general patterns. There are actually
two differences between the imitation variable related to Ego’s Alter and
Other Alters. Next to the obvious change from Ego’s Alter to Other
Alters, which is expected to cause a smaller effect, the formulation for
Other Alters explicitly includes multiple Alters. This last change induces
a more general signal that this type of interaction makes sense, which
apparently causes a stronger imitation effect than the effect caused by
just knowing that Other Egos trust your Alter. In addition, we see later
that the effect of imitation related to Ego’s Alter depends on the infor-
mation Ego has about her Alter.13
As expected, Future has a positive significant effect on the attractiveness
of a vignette, which is an effect of control via dyadic embeddedness.
Density has a positive effect, but it is weakly significant. A possible expla-
nation of this weak effect might be that the definition of Density = 1 in our
scenario lacks an explicit connection to Ego. This is in contrast with
Outdegree, which facilitates control via network embeddedness and pro-
vides one of the strongest positive effects. Thus, we find strong evidence
for effects of learning and control through social networks on trust as well
as some evidence for imitation.
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Table 3 Probit Models of the Choice of Vignettes (69 subjects, 690 observations)
Model 1 Model 2 
Independent Marginal Marginal 
variable Hyp. effect SE effect SE
Partner Uncertainty – −.18** .043 −.21** .048
Trustworthiness of Alter + .61** .066 .59** .075
Trustworthiness of Other Alters + .36** .046 .37** .047
Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter + .06 .044 .03 .058
Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs + .16** .038 .16** .038
Other Alters
Future + .20** .035 .20** .035
Outdegree + .23** .037 .23** .037
Density + .07* .031 .07* .031
City 0 −.02 .038 −.01 .037
Interaction effects
Partner Uncertainty × + .06 .097
Trustworthiness of Alter
Partner Uncertainty × Other + .10 .086
Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter
Knowledge × Trustworthiness – −.07 .062
of Alter
Knowledge × Trustworthiness – −.05 .050
of Other Alters
Knowledge × Other Egos’ – −.03 .039
Trustfulness vs Alter
Knowledge × Other Egos’ – −.04 .039
Trustfulness vs Other Alters
Partner Uncertainty × −.00 .002
Risk aversion
Tests of hypothesis 4 χ2 p value
Trustworthiness of Alter > Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter 53.71 .00
Trustworthiness of Other Alters > Other Egos’ Trustfulness 25.71 .00
vs Other Alters
**p < .01 and *p < .05 indicate two-sided significance based on Huber standard errors modi-
fied for clustering.
Interaction Effects with Subject Characteristics
The first two interaction effects regard information and uncertainty about
the partner’s capacities. The interaction of Partner Uncertainty and
Trustworthiness of Alter shows the expected sign, but the effect is very
weak. Apparently, the value Ego attributes to this information does not
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depend on how uncertain she is about Alter’s competence. The interaction
of Partner Uncertainty and Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter is not signifi-
cant. However, we tested the contrast between no information and having
information from Other Egos’ Trustfulness vs Alter in combination with high
uncertainty, and this is significant (p = .04). The test shows that the sum of
these two effects is different from 0. This result supports that there is an
effect of imitation, but that the effect only occurs under specific conditions,
i.e. if Ego is uncertain about Alter’s competence.
The following four interaction terms refer to the interaction between
knowledge about the stock market and the information available from
Other Egos. Although all these interactions are in the expected direction
none of them is even close to significance. There are at least two explana-
tions for this outcome. First, our design is not particularly suited to test
effects of subject characteristics, because we only have 69 subjects. Thus,
in this sense we have only 69 cases to test effects about interactions with
subject characteristics. Second, the data show that most subjects had very
limited knowledge about the stock market. Hardly any of them were able
to give an accurate estimate of the Dutch AEX index, and only a couple
had an approximate idea about the value of this index. If one wants to
investigate these interactions further one should try to recruit subjects
from a pool with more variance on knowledge about the stock market.
Finally, we included an interaction term between partner uncertainty and
risk aversion to check whether people with different risk preferences
made different choices although we did not have a specific hypothesis on
this. In principle, interaction terms between risk aversion and all vignette
variables could be included in the analysis and we did run tests of all
these interaction terms. However, individual preferences for any of the
vignette variables did not vary according to risk aversion and adding
such effects did not change any of the other effects. Thus, in order to show
that, as far as our empirical results are concerned, risk aversion does not
matter, we decided to include only one interaction term in Table 3, namely
between risk aversion and partner uncertainty because partner uncer-
tainty is formulated in terms of competence of Alter, and a less competent
Alter intuitively implies a higher risk for Ego.
We tested also a range of interactions of other subject characteristics,
just to be sure that there were no clear indications against our statistical
assumption that the weights subjects assign to the different variables are
the same among subjects. It turned out that we could not significantly
improve on our model 1 by adding interactions with subject characteris-
tics such as sex, age, birthplace, etc. We also found no differences between
subjects who found the vignettes more or less realistic, or between
subjects for whom the described scenario was closer or less close to their
own actual situation.
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Conclusions
In this article, we provide a theoretical explanation for possible effects of
imitation in trust problems. Imitative behaviour was incorporated in
existing theories about the effects of social networks on trust as a particu-
lar form of learning by means of information accessible to Ego through
the network. We described four different types of information in order to
distinguish learning effects from imitation effects. This distinction is
based on the information available to Ego about transactions among third
parties in the past. On the one hand, if Ego is informed that Other Egos
trusted Ego’s partner (Alter) or other partners (Other Alters) and their
trust was honoured, Ego can learn from this information. On the other
hand, if Ego is only informed about Other Egos trusting Alter (or Other
Alters) without knowing whether their trust was honoured, then Ego can
imitate Other Egos. The importance of these types of information depends
on Ego’s uncertainty related to her trust problem with Alter. For example,
she might be uncertain about the capacities of Alter and she might lack
knowledge about the market in which her transaction with Alter takes
place. We hypothesized that if Ego is more uncertain about her partner,
she will value information about capacities more, while if she is more
uncertain about the market, she will value any information about similar
transactions more. We tested these hypotheses by means of a vignette
experiment in which subjects had to choose between pairs of vignettes.
The results confirmed that actors learn if they face trust problems with
uncertainty. In addition, learning effects turn out to be larger than imita-
tion effects as hypothesized. However, we did not find general support
for the variations in importance of learning and imitation under more and
less uncertainty. We only found a slight tendency that imitation of trust-
ful behaviour is more important when uncertainty about the competence
of the partner is larger. Conversely, if Ego has (positive) information about
Alter’s competence she does not imitate, but rather relies on, the partner’s
competence. Nevertheless, actors do imitate trusting behaviour if trusting
behaviour seems to make sense in general, which is indicated by a signif-
icant effect of imitation of trusting behaviour of other Egos vs other
Alters. Therefore, although imitation does not affect trust in every situa-
tion, our results support the idea that imitation should be considered
among trust-breeding mechanisms. Furthermore, if imitation is particu-
larly important when Ego is uncertain about Alter, a trusting environment
is particularly important for newcomers.
For example, when new employees enter an organization, they will be
more easily integrated if they find a trusting and cooperative environ-
ment, because they will ‘learn’ to trust their colleagues by imitating their
behaviour. Moreover, imitation is particularly important for newcomers
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also because other sources to build trust might not be immediately available
to newcomers. The illustrations in this article have focused on horizon-
tal relations between colleagues, but of course similar processes can be
expected to build trust in other types of relations such as between man-
agers and their subordinates. Not only knowing that a manager supports
others in resolving their problems will increase Ego’s trust (see Bijlsma
and van de Bunt, 2003), but just observing that others ask a manager to
help them solve a problem will increase Ego’s trust although to a lesser
extent than if Ego knows that appropriate help is provided.
Although some hypotheses were not supported by the data, the theo-
retical ideas underlying our hypotheses about individual behaviour in
trust problems appeared to be promising and call for better tests. This arti-
cle only represents a first attempt to distinguish imitation from learning
theoretically as well as empirically. The inclusion of imitative behaviour
and learning in one theoretical model undoubtedly constitutes a major
task for future research. In addition, alternative empirical research is nec-
essary for a more extensive test of such a theory. In this respect, a promis-
ing option for further research includes laboratory experiments using
controlled networks. Networks could be created in which actors play trust
games and exchange information at the same time. Then, information is
not so much predetermined by the experimenter, but is created within the
experiment. Such an experiment could provide the possibility to observe
actual imitation at work (e.g. Barrera and Buskens, 2005). In such contexts,
information cannot only be positive, but at times also negative. Therefore,
this context can be used to study perverse effects of imitation. We would
expect that if networks are dense and the flow of information is fast, small
mistakes in the decision processes of actors facing trust problems could
have large consequences. If actors base their decision on imitation, for
example, it could happen that they trust the ‘wrong’ partner or that they
mistrust the ‘right’ partner. Such mistakes are much more likely if uncer-
tainty is high and the content of the information is limited, i.e. if imitation
is the best option available for the actor.
Another improvement that could be included in the experiment is that
uncertainty be more systematically varied between subjects, rather than
looking at their expertise with respect to the specific trust problem as a
potential element affecting the level of uncertainty. Moreover, one could
think of other conditions in which imitation could be facilitated, e.g. if
information is costly, subjects might be willing to buy information about
the behaviour of others in similar roles, but might find it too expensive
to buy the information of the outcomes of such transactions as well, leav-
ing them with information that allows for imitation only. Finally, experi-
mental tests are typically strong tests of formal social theories; however,
they often lack possibilities for statements about external validity.
 at University of Groningen on November 10, 2008 http://iss.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Barrera and Buskens Imitation and Learning under Uncertainty
391
Therefore, it is important to investigate which real-life situations would
be suitable to test our theory about imitation in trust situations with sur-
vey data.
Appendix: Translation of the Instructions for the
Vignette Experiment
Thanks for agreeing to participate in this experiment. As a reward for your coop-
eration you will receive €5 afterwards. This experiment is part of a research proj-
ect on human decision-making. It is very important that you answer all questions
carefully.
Read the instructions carefully. In the first part of the experiment, you are asked
to imagine yourself in a hypothetical situation. You have to imagine that you want
to ask someone to invest your money on the stock market. First, you will get a
general description of this situation: The Scenario. Try to imagine that you are
really in this situation. Thereafter, you have to choose between two persons whom
you would let invest your money.
We want to stress that we want your opinion. There are no ‘correct’ or ‘wrong’
answers in this part of the experiment.
The second part of the experiment contains some questions about you. In prin-
ciple, you can complete the experiment at your own. Nevertheless, if you still
have questions, please ask the experiment leader.
The Scenario
• You’ve recently had the idea of starting up a small e-business. You discovered
a niche in the market and you want to jump into it quickly. Due to the very fast
developments in this market, this has to happen fast otherwise the idea will
probably become irrelevant.
• The bank where you try to get a loan to get the business going asks for a start-
ing capital of €5000. You only have €3000 and with only your student
allowance, you will not be able to obtain the €5000.
• Your parents are not prepared to lend you the rest of the money. They find the
investment too risky and they are afraid that this business plan will distract
you from your studies.
• Within your cohort you know two fellow students, named ‘Jansen’ and ‘de
Vries’, who invest in the stock market themselves, and it seems that they are
doing fairly well. You do not have enough knowledge about the stock market
to make the investments yourself.
• You ask Jansen and de Vries and they tell you that you have a good chance of
increasing your money from €3000 to €5000 if one of them invests the money
on the stock market. The both ask for 10 percent of the profit if the investments
turn out to be profitable.
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• Jansen and De Vries both indicate that there are of course risks related to these
kinds of investments and that unfortunately they cannot share in the losses if
for whatever reasons the investments are not profitable.
• Although Jansen and De Vries are members of your cohort, you do not know
them very well and you have never done this kind of business with them
before.
The Task
Imagine that, in spite of the risks involved, you decide to let Jansen or de Vries
invest your money within the scenario given above. We provide you now with
descriptions of Jansen and de Vries. For every pair of descriptions, we ask you to
compare them and indicate which one you would prefer to do the deal. Even if the
description does not match with your own situation, you have to try to imagine
yourself in the situation as it is described. In addition, we ask that for every pair
of descriptions you indicate how strong your preference is for the chosen fellow
student. You can indicate your choices by marking the relevant boxes. You will be
asked these two questions for 10 different pairs of descriptions. The scenario given
above applies to all pairs of descriptions. Do not hesitate to read the scenario again if
this helps to make your choices.
Notes
Useful suggestions and comments by Werner Raub, Jeroen Weesie, Chris Snijders,
Ronald Batenburg, Tom Snijders, Rafael Wittek, Andreas Flache, Christian
Steglich and Patricia van Echtelt are gratefully acknowledged. This article is part
of the research programme ‘Management of Matches’ funded by the Netherlands
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) under grant PGS 50-370. Buskens’
contribution is part of the project ‘Third-Party Effects in Cooperation Problems’ of
the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW).
1. For reader friendliness and in correspondence with conventional use of pro-
nouns in the literature, we use female gender for Ego and male for Alter.
2. We use here a rather restrictive definition of control, namely the extent to
which the long-term relation between Ego and Alter can be expected to affect
Alter’s behaviour. Often control is defined more generally in terms of
processes through which Ego can affect the behaviour of Alter (see, for exam-
ple, Das and Teng, 1998).
3. In Dutch universities a cohort of students is called jaargroep (literally year
group) and consists of all students that begin a given curriculum of studies in
the same year. Typically, unless the group is too numerous, they all know each
other and form a rather cohesive group.
4. This setting does not allow for an ‘exit’ option. We are only interested in
which Alter the subjects choose after the decision is made to do the deal with
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at least one of the two partners. We do not know whether the subjects find
either of the two subjects a reasonable option for such a transaction at all.
5. Jansen and de Vries are two of the most common Dutch surnames; we expect
no preference for one or the other name.
6. Some of the characteristics (such as variables concerning the type of informa-
tion available to Ego, for example) do not refer specifically to a person, but
more generally to a situation; nonetheless we have no reason to expect sub-
jects to evaluate this information incorrectly.
7. In order to have all cases included in our analysis, missing values of the fac-
tor score were imputed with the best possible prediction from the data avail-
able for the variables that were used to construct the factor score using the
command impute in Stata 8.
8. Five items were included and for each item we calculated the deviation
between the value of the lottery for the subject and the risk-neutral value.
Cronbach’s alpha on these items was .88 so we summed the five deviations as
a measure for risk aversion.
9. A vignette can be represented by a vector x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) where xi rep-
resents the ith variable of the vignette. A Pareto ordering can be defined for a
pair (x, y) of vignettes such that x ≥ y if, and only if, xi ≥ yi for all i = 1, …, 6.
10. City is incorporated with Partner Uncertainty, which has three categories; this
restriction excludes two of the six possible combinations.
11. This answer was used to transform preference into a scale, which was subse-
quently used as dependent variable to estimate subjects’ choice with an ordi-
nary least squares regression model. However, these results are not presented
in the fourth section because they were not substantially different from the
results that are presented.
12. There are no indications that such biases exist in our data.
13. Barrera and Buskens (2005) tested a set of similar hypotheses on effects of
learning and imitation using a laboratory experiment in which subjects
played repeated trust games and received information about choices made by
other subjects. They found that imitation of the behaviour of other subjects
paired with a different partner influences Ego’s own behaviour only if no bet-
ter information – for example about Alter – is available to her.
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